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I. Introduction 
One of the major issues in the study of development economics today is the effect natural 
resources have on economic growth. It would seem intuitive that great natural resource wealth 
would lead to economic growth, as an abundance of natural resources would increase the overall 
wealth and purchasing power of a nation. Yet a cursory look at the nations of the world does not 
support this idea. Countries like Nigeria, while extremely rich in natural resources, are economic 
basket cases, while countries like Japan and South Korea, while relatively resource poor, have 
experienced extremely rapid growth over the past few decades. This disparity has led economists 
and academics of all sorts to wonder whether in fact there is an inverse causal relationship 
between a country’s national resource wealth and its economic growth: a “natural resource 
curse.” 
 Recent interest in the relationship between natural resources and growth was sparked by a 
widely read set of papers by Sachs and Warner. Throughout the mid 90s, they published a series 
of papers in which they made the case for the existence of a “natural resource curse”. In these, 
they showed that, on aggregate, there is a negative relationship between the size of an economy’s 
natural resource sector and its economic growth rates over the past few years.  
 There is a great deal of cross-country work bearing on the resource curse but very few 
studies have used within country variation to test the variety of hypotheses linking natural 
resources and growth. For example, are states that have a historic dependence on mining, such as 
West Virginia and Alaska, more likely to have sustained lesser growth than states such as 
California or Washington State, which do not have such a dependence? This is a difficult 
question to answer, in part because of the fact that  labor mobility exists between U.S. states to a 
degree that it does not between separate nations. Such mobility creates a channel by which 
increases in wages atrract migration, increasing population and lowering estimates of 
GDP/Capita. This paper looks at data on natural resources and GDP/Capita over the period 
between 1970-1999 and shows that, when spatial equilibrium dynamics are accounted for, there 
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is evidence that may support the existence of a natural resource curse of sorts within the United 
States. 
 
II. Literature Review.  
 The current incarnation of the debate over the existence of a natural resource curse began 
with the publishing of Sachs and Warner’s 1995 working paper Natural Resource Abundance 
and Economic Growth. In this paper,  Sachs and Warner documented the relationship between 
the share of natural resources in a country’s economy and its overall growth rates. Their results 
formed the basis for the idea of the natural resource curse as applies to development. Over the 
past few decades, Sachs and Warner published several papers that expanded on their thesis. In a 
summarization of their work, Sachs and Warner (2001) show results that expressed strong 
evidence for the existence of a natural resource curse. The basic methodology they adopted was 
to run a standard cross-country growth regression, then adding in a natural resource abundance 
variable to see its partial effect on economic growth. They defined this variable as the ratio of 
exports of primary resources divided by total exports, as well as several controlling variables that 
others have proposed as potential explanations of growth rates. In every regression, they found a 
statistically significant negative relationship between growth and natural resource abundance. 
 Sachs and Warner(1995) also ran many other regressions controlling for up to 14 
different potential determinants of growth, such as corruption and other political factors. The 
results of these regressions all supported their initial hypothesis of a natural resource curse. 
 While this at first seems fairly convincing, upon further examination, the assumptions of 
Sachs and Warner raise some questions. Mainly, their measurement of natural resource 
dependence is defined as the total share of primary exports over total exports, or SXP as they call 
it in Sachs and Warner (1995.) Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke(2009) convincingly argue that a 
country that in a country experiencing low growth and economic dysfunction, natural resources 
will be the last export industry standing since it is an industry that requires less human capital 
and Total Factor Productivity than manufacturing. Thus, one could argue that a predominantly 
resource driven export sector is in fact a symptom of low growth, rather than a cause. Thus, 
because of their measure of natural resources abundance, Sachs and Warner’s estimates may be 
plagued by endogeneity if causality runs the opposite way. Therefore, measuring the inherent 
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natural resource wealth of a country and determining its effect on growth may have greater 
explanatory power. This would help to assuage endogeneity concerns, because the natural 
resource wealth of a country, unlike the size of its export sector, is randomly distributed, and 
unaffected by any sort of political factors. 
 Brunschweiller and Bulte (2008) made this argument in a 2008 paper that referred to the 
Natural Resource Curse, as commonly understood, as a complete red herring. They criticized 
Sachs and Warner’s use of the share of natural resources in total exports as a poor measure of 
natural resource wealth, claiming that a dependence on natural resources was endogenous. They 
instead introduced a new measure of natural resource abundance, which was based on data from 
a World Bank study on the natural resource wealth of different countries (World Bank, 1997.) 
This study used as its explanatory variable the net present value in 2004 of an aggregate of 
mineral, oil, and other general types of natural resource wealth. This was a superior explanatory 
variable to use than Sachs and Warner’s use of export share, because unlike resource 
dependence, which is very likely not distributed randomly and independent of other policies, the 
amount of natural resources a country is naturally endowed with is a function of natural 
geography and thus uncorrelated with any of the other determinants of growth. 
 This change in methodology attracted considerable attention. Up until then, according to 
Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke(2009) most of the literature tended to use the terms dependence 
and abundance interchangeably. The work of Brunschweiller and Bulte(2008) underscores the 
importance of distinguishing between a natural abundance of resources rather than the 
dependence of resources. Most recent assessments of the Resource Curse (Van der Ploeg, 2009, 
Bond and Malik 2009,) have taken care to distinguish between natural resource dependence vs. 
abundance in their methodology. Unfortunately, due to the limited nature of the World Bank 
data, particularly the difficulty in accurately measuring mineral deposits (Van der Ploeg, 2009) 
as well as lack of availability for several different countries, it is dubious whether this measure 
accurately represents the total natural resource endowment of a country. As a result, most of the 
literature still uses Natural Resource Dependence, since it is much easier to quantify, but the 
potential endogeneity remains a challenge to studies using such measures. 
 When trying to apply the logic of the natural resource curse to U.S. states, past work by 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2006), as well as this paper, will be using the Sachs and Warner estimate 
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of Resource Dependence, rather than the Brunschweiller and Bolte measure of Resource 
Abundance, to assess the existence of the curse. The reason for this is twofold. One is that data 
for the traditional Sachs and Warner style estimate is much easier to find. The other is that, 
within U.S. states, specialization in natural resources is, on the face of it, less of an automatic 
indication of all of the other sectors having fled. After all, within a country like the U.S, with 
perfect capital mobility and free trade between states, specialization in a particular sector might 
not be as damaging a strategy as it would be for an entire country. In addition, labor mobility 
between state borders is much more fluid than between national borders. 
  There are many different channels through which natural resources themselves have the 
potential to impact the growth of the economy. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) established  that the 
excessive price volatility of natural resources leads to excessive volatility of the GDP growth rate 
in countries dependent on natural resources. They also establish a channel by which 
overinvestment in natural resources crowds out other industries. Thus, when the price of 
whatever natural resource a country is dependent on falls, overall revenues fall and the state is 
unable to shift resources to other industries to make up for the shortfall. Thus, GDP/Capita 
would fluctuate with the price of the natural resource, which tends to be very volatile. This 
volatility, in turn is responsible for the drop in GDP/Capita.  Ramey and Ramey (2004) show 
strong support for the idea that high volatility in GDP/Capita leads to a sharp decrease in growth 
rates for countries. They show that that volatility leads to uncertainty, which tends to depress 
factors like investment that lead to high growth.  
 Building on the work of Ramey and Ramey (2004) and Koren and Tenreyro(2007) Van 
der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009)  ran regressions in order to show that volatility was the key 
channel through which a dependence on natural resources handled economic growth. They were 
able to find statistically significant  negative correlations between standard deviation of growth, 
which was their measure of volatility, and growth. This provided support for Ramey and 
Ramey(2004) and Koren and Tenreyro(2007). It also established a channeeld bt which 
dependence on natural resources for economic activity will result in high volatility of output, 
which will lead to higher uncertainty, which will discourage the rate of investment and lead to 
low growth. 
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  This conclusion was challenged by Malik and Bond(2009), who sought to see if there 
was a direct connection between natural resource abundance and investment. Ultimately, they 
did not find such a connection, arguing, in an analysis that would support the conclusions of 
Lederman and Maloney(2007), that it is the specific structure of exports, i.e. how the different 
exports are proportioned, that determines investment, and thus has consequences for growth. 
However, it is worth noting that a strong emphasis of a country on a particular resource sector 
can increase the potential for rent seeking.  One of the key findings of both Malik and 
Bond(2009) and Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke(2009) is that the negative effects of natural 
resources on growth tend to be strongest when they are associated with other potential 
impediments to growth. One theme that is particularly recurrent is that natural resources tend to 
amplify the negative effects of bad government and corruption on the growth process. The 
papers mentioned above have mostly found the strongest affects of natural resources on growth 
are found when accounting for these variables.  
 One of the main variables that literature on the Natural Resource Curse deals with is the 
effect that Natural Resources have on growth as a result of social and political institutions. 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) theorize that rents from natural resources tend to increase the 
corruption in an economy and thus depress economic growth, but with the contingency that this 
effect differs based on the quality of the democratic institutions in that country. Thus, a country 
with strong, high functioning democratic institutions will not experience corruption due to a 
natural resource boom. As their main explanatory variable, they use Resource Rents, defined as 
the difference between a commodity’s world market price and its extraction costs. The use of 
rents avoids the problems with following the Sachs and Warner methodology described earlier. 
Basically, they argue that a game develops between politicians and the populace of a given 
country. They argue that essentially, there are good and bad politicians, good politicians 
basically being ones who try to look out for the welfare of the economy and bad politicians who 
are only self-interested. It is in the interest of a bad politician to appropriate as much profit for 
himself from the resource rents, but he also must stay in power, and thus to do so must restrain 
his greed and mimic a good politician in order to gain the support of the populace. The extent to 
which he can do this is based on the strength of the democratic institutions in those areas.  
 Others have argued that the determining factors of whether or not Natural Resources are a 
curse depend on the political and institutional effects of heterogeneity. Hodler(2006) describes a 
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model by which fractionalized countries suffer from an increase in natural resources, where as 
more homogenized countries are able to use the natural resources as a blessing. His principal 
model suggests that in fractionalized countries natural resources serve as a sort of prize that the 
different groups will fight over. Thus, a resource bonanza such as an oil boom will lead to 
increased rent seeking and fighting between different groups, which will discourage investment 
and dampen growth.  Using many different measures of fractionalization, including linguistic, 
ethnic, and religious measures, he regressed  GDP/Capita on Natural Resource Abundance, using 
the World Bank measures of resource abundance rather than Sachs and Warner estimates of 
resource dependence, and comes up with strong results confirming his hypothesis. These results 
show that countries with relatively homogenous populations tend to experience income increases 
in response to resource booms, but that countries that heterogeneous do not. This explanation 
goes a long way to explaining obvious exceptions to the natural resource curse, such as Norway, 
which in addition to having a dominant share of their economy devoted to resource exports, has a 
very high standard of living. This ceases to become a mystery when fractionalization is 
introduced, due to Norway’s high degree of homogeneity among the populace.  
 In addition to being contingent on democratic and demographic factors of countries, other 
work has argued that these factors can interact in a certain sense. Thus the question at hand, 
many have argued, is not whether or not a state has a strong democracy, but as to the exact 
nature and setup of the democracy. Recent work by Andersen and Aslaksen (2007) has looked at 
whether presidential or parliamentary democracies are more likely to fall prey to a natural 
resource curse. They also look at the dimension of whether or not a country favors a majoritarian 
or proportional method of voting to elect their leaders.  
 The logic behind this is that parliamentary forms of governments, in order to be effective, 
must create broad coalitions among most of the interest groups in the population in order to 
maintain power. According to theoretical work by Perrson and Tabellini(2004), the propensity of 
government to engage in equal spending amongst the general public as opposed to targeting 
specific special interest groups is reinforced by the ability that parliaments have to cast a vote of 
no confidence in their executive. Thus if a parliamentary country were to receive a resource 
boon, the gains in welfare would be likely to be distributed across the population, which would 
increase the overall welfare and growth of GDP per capita. 
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 As far as these political factors are concerned, it is not hard to see that an analysis of the 
United States alone would control for most of these political factors. The United States is not a 
country that is famous for experiencing a great deal of ethnic sectarian violent conflict, at least 
not at the scale experienced by many African nations, and thus, this is not likely to be a factor. In 
addition, all U.S. states share more or less the same political institutions at a state level, and 
identical institutions at the Federal Level. Thus, the nature of the rent seeking would be very 
different, and factors such as, for example, the presidential vs. parliamentary makeup of the 
executive branch described above would not be a factor worthy of consideration. To be sure, 
there do exist differences in state level governing practices, but these are smaller and more 
nebulous than the differences that exist between countries. Nevertheless, it is possible that states 
with more of a natural resource sector could seek rent through congressional lobbying. However, 
comparing states by different levels of corruption would prove to be quite difficult, as Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh (2006) have found. 
 Work by Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2006) has focused on additional potential channels for 
the Natural Resource Curse to operate at the state level. One is education, the idea that states 
with an emphasis on Natural Resources are less likely to invest in education, due to their focus 
on employing laborers for primary resource extraction, which could impede their abilities to 
develop more knowledge based growth sectors in the future. They make a similar argument for 
the Research and Development sector. However, their regressions in general found that, while 
states that underinvested in these sectors did indeed experience negative growth as a result, these 
were more likely related to policy failures independent of any Natural Resource Curse. A 
problem with their study, however, was their lack of data, as their data only goes back as far as 
1986. This study, however, will be analyzing data as far back as 1970. 
 The channel that we are trying to investigate for the purposes of this paper is the Dutch 
disease channel. The proposed channel basically works through a few channels. One is that a 
sudden boom in natural resources leads to an appreciation of a country’s currency, leading its 
citizens to prefer domestic consumption. This causes an underinvestment in the export sector as 
well as a decrease in foreign investment, which could be detrimental to future growth. This 
channel is not likely to be a factor when comparing U.S. states against each other, since they all 
share the same currency. 
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  The other Dutch disease channel works as follows: A discovery of natural resources in a 
country or state causes an overinvestment in the natural resource sector, which leads to 
investment in the natural resource sector instead of sectors that are conducive to long run growth. 
This leads to a decrease in Total Factor Productivity, or TFP, which is an important factor in the 
Solow growth model that is vital  for continued growth.   This decrease in productivity is 
reflected in a diminished growth rate of the GDP, and thus, the GDP/Capita. However, the initial 
boom of natural resources would also lead to an increase in wages, which in the context of a 
cross-country analysis, would lead to an increase in the wages for existing workers. In United 
States, there are no barriers, other than basic geography, to prevent workers from moving from 
states with low wages to states with high wages. Therefore, it is possible that the share of Natural 
Resources in GDP would actually have a negative effect on GDP/Capita due to an increase in the 
overall population of the state, rather than merely a decrease in productivity. 
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III. Data and Methodology. 
 Primarily, we are concerned with whether overinvesting in Natural Resources has a 
negative effect on TFP growth, which would in turn lead to a long term decrease in the rate of 
economic growth. 
 We use a measure similar to that of Sachs and Warner. The independent variable we will 
be using, NATSHARE, is composed of dividing the total output of the mining sector by the total 
industrial output of the state, or GDP. We have chosen to use the mining sector to represent the 
natural resource dependence of  a state for a variety of reasons. One is that it provides the 
clearest example of the Dutch Disease phenomenon, as the presence of mineral deposits or oil is 
one of the clearest examples of a commodity which does not require much innovation or TFP 
growth to develop. It merely must be extracted from the ground and sold in crude form. The 
other reason is that the NAICS and SIC definitions of the mining sector are nearly identical, so 
this would preclude a conversion between systems, simplifying the construction of a longer 
dataset. 
 The Bureau of Economic Analysis maintained by the Department of Commerce compiles 
statistics on the composition of United States Gross Domestic Product by State. From their 
online database we were able to obtain data on the size on the composition of the GDP of each 
U.S. state and use it to construct our variable NATSHARE. This data is classified according to 
two systems: SIC and NAICS. The SIC classification covers  the time period from 1967-1997 
and the NAICS system covers data from 1997-present. For our regressions, we will be testing the 
years from 1970-1999. We chose 1970 in 1967 because we needed to use U.S. census estimates 
for population data, which are measured on the decade. 
 From this BEA data, we were able to construct the variable NATSHARE by dividing the 
size of the SIC and NAICS Industry classification “Mining” by the total industrial output. This 
measure includes both the extraction and refinement of  both minerals and oil. 
  We can start out by running a basic growth regression on the log of GDP/Capita in 1999 
on the NATSHARE variable that we have developed. In the following graph, the growth rate of 
GDP/Capita is plotted against the Mining share of GDP in 1970. 
  
10 
 
From this graph we can see that, while most states did not have a high mining sector to 
begin with, there is a clear negative trend associated with the presence of a large reliance on the 
Mining Sector.  
 These results would seem to indicate that there is indeed a statistically significant 
negative relationship between the NATSHARE variable and the growth rate of a U.S. state. 
However, before accepting these results as an accurate indicator, there are a few sources of bias 
that we must address. In addition to potential omitted variable bias, there is also the possibility 
that this is merely evidence of convergence. One of the main feature of the Solow growth model 
is that the growth rates of less developed economies tend to be higher than the growth rates of 
more developed economies. To account for this possibility, we show in column (2) of Table 1 an 
additional regression that was run using the log of state GDP/Capita in 1970 as a controlling 
variable. We are controlling for absolute convergence, not conditional convergence because, 
following  Barro and Sala-I Martin(1991) we assume that within the same country, conditions 
are roughly equal, therefore we do not need additional control variables.  From these results we 
can see that, while there is a statistically significant convergence effect in regression (2), the 
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coefficient for NATSHARE in the second regression is still negative, significant, and only 
slightly less than in regression (1). 
 
     Table 1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p<0.05*; ** p<0.01 
 Table 1. This table shows the results of regressions of GDP/Capita growth from 1970-1999  
 on several explanatory variables. the Mining/GDP measure is constructed from NAICS and SIC estimates for size of the mining sector 
 in 1970. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses, with asterisks(*)  denoting significance level. 
 
 When applying the Natural Resource Curse logic to states, rather than countries, there are 
a few considerations that must be taken into account. One is that as established by Glaesar and 
Gottlieb, states are in a spatial equilibrium with regards to both Labor and Capital flows.   
 To account for this spatial equilibrium, we adopt the methodology specified by Glaesar 
and Gottlieb(2009),  which they developed from earlier work by Rosen (1979) and Roback 
(1982), in  order to determine how natural resource dependence affects the Total Factor 
Productivity of a regional economy. 
 Like Glaesar and Gottlieb, our analysis starts with the typical production function used by 
growth Economists: A
i
tK
α
L
1-α
, a Cobb-Douglas production function where K represents capital, 
L represents labor and A represents Total Factor Productivity.  Like Glaesar and Gottlieb(2009), 
we will be making the simplifying assumption of considering L to be composed of both skilled 
Mining1970/GDP1970 -0.036 -0.033 
 (0.009)** (0.009)** 
ln(GDP/cap)1970  -0.008 
  (0.003)* 
Constant 0.017 0.093 
 (0.001)** (0.029)** 
R
2
 0.25 0.35 
Observations 50 50 
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and unskilled labor.
1
 We also follow their methodology in assuming that total capital K is a 
geometric weighted average of non-traded and traded capital, so that total output is   
A
i
t  KN
αγ
KT
1-αγ
 L
1-α
. In this equation KN represents non-traded capital and KT represents traded 
capital. 
 According to Glaesar and Gottlieb, The assumption of spatial equilibrium between states 
means that at any given time the number of  workers (population) in a state is subject to the 
following equality condition: 
θit GT
β
GN
1-β
 = θitW
i
t(P
i
t)
β-1
 
where θ is amenities, GT is the consumption of traded goods, GN is the consumption of non-
traded goods, W is wages, and P is prices, and β represents the share of traded goods in total 
utility. The basic idea is that workers derive utility from their real wage, which is to say that they 
prefers to live in a place where the ratio of their nominal wages to the nominal price of goods in 
the area is the highest. The above equation indicates that a worker must be living in a place 
where their consumption of goods and amenities is equal to the amount of goods and amenities 
they can buy with their real wage. This is important to our United States framework because it 
indicates that if there is an increase in the real wage available to a worker in any given state that 
he does not live in, he will move to that state. This could potentially skew the results from our 
previous regressions, as an increase in the Total Factor Productivity of a state would cause an 
increase in wages, which would cause an increase in population, which would negatively affect 
GDP/Capita due to an increase in the population. 
   From the above equations, Glaesar and Gottlieb basically formulate three main 
equations that can be used to solve for population, wages, and the prices of non-traded goods. 
These equations are reproduced here: 
     (1) 
   (2)  
    (3) 
These equations show that the equilibrium conditions for population, wages, and the prices of 
goods are dependent on state level TFP, in addition to other factors. This is because increasing 
                                                                        
1
 Glaesar and Gottlieb page 991 
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TFP leads to increasing wages, which attracts more workers, which leads to an increase in 
population, which ultimately leads to an increase in the demand for goods and amenities in the 
area, which raises prices. The effect of TFP on these parameters is represented by the λA 
variables in the  above equations.  To determine any detrimental effects of natural resources on 
the growth of state real wages, which ultimately is the measure of welfare that previous and 
current natural resource literature is concerned with, the main question we must answer is: What 
effect does a natural resource boom have on total factor productivity?  
 Glaesar and Gottlieb provide a methodology to determine this measure. From the 
previous equations, Glaesar and Gottlieb show that one can calculate  δA, the total effect of any 
variable Xt
i
 , which in our case is NATSHARE, the share of natural resources in total exports,  
on the productivity of the traded goods sector.  
 =        (4) 
where  and  are the population and wage coefficients obtained from regressions of wages 
and population on the natural resource share .Basically, an increase in TFP leads to a growth in 
both population and wages. By looking at the effect of natural resources and wages, we can use 
the above equation to infer the effect of Natural Resources on TFP. In addition, we can assume 
that when we take the derivative of equation 4, the same equation will also apply to the growth 
rates of , , and  In order to determine the amount by which the share of natural resources 
affects  the growth of the  productivity of the non-traded sector, we will run regressions of the 
growth rates of  GDP/Capita and growth rate of population over the period form 1970-1999 on 
the variable NATSHARE, the share of mining in GDP at the beginning of the period. We use 
five year averages instead of yearly ones in order to control for any changes in population or 
GDP that may be due to natural fluctuations from the business cycle. We also calculate this 
measure for the growth rate of the entire 30 year period from 1970-1999.  This estimate should 
show us the amount by which the share or mining in GDP affects the TFP growth of the state. 
The estimates for δA can be seen in Table 2.  
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Table 2. 
Entire Period 
δA  70-99        -0.02759 
       (0.0076)** 
Five year Intervals 
δA  70-74 0.084 
 (0.0281)** 
 
δA 75-79 
 
0.0412 
 (0.013)** 
 
δA 80-84 
 
-0.0692 
 (0.0120)** 
 
δA 85-89 
 
-0.133 
 (0.0104)** 
 
δA 90-94 
 
-0.0746 
 (0.0209)** 
 
δA 95-99 
 
-0.124 
(0.0209)** 
  
      * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 2. This table shows five year average measures of  δA, which is the effect of the mining sector on TFP growth. Standard errors 
are in parentheses.  The measure of δA  the entire 30 year period is shown at the top.  See how natural resource investement share had a 
positive effect on TFP growth in the 1970s, but a negative one from 1980-1999, whereas overall, the  cumulative effect over the 30 
year period is negative. 
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 IV. Results. 
 Following the methods of Glaesar and Gottlieb, and with the assumption that their 
formula can be applied to growth rates, we have found results that suggested that having a large 
natural resource sector had substantial, positive effects on TFP growth for the period from 1970-
1974 and 1975-1979, but then had significant negative effects after that. Overall, from the period 
1970-1999,  the effect of a large resource sector on TFP growth was negative. 
 It is interesting to note that these numbers reflect the movement of oil prices in this era. 
As can be seen in the following chart, in the 1970s, oil prices were high due to the oil shocks that 
were a result of the various OPEC oil embargoes of that era, whereas from 1980 on, oil prices 
dropped significantly and stayed low until the early 2000s. These movements can be seen in 
Figure 1 below. Thus it would seem that TFP growth attributable to the mining and oil sector 
follows the price of oil quite nicely. As the price of oil grows, so grows TFP, and as it falls, the 
growth rate of TFP does as well. Over the entire 30 year period we can see that the effect of 
natural resource dependence on TFP growth is negative. So does it follow then, that the effect of 
natural resource dependence of TFP growth is dependent entirely on the prices of the goods in 
question? 
 From our data at least, this seems likely. This would indicate that natural resource 
dependent states are overinvested in natural resources to the point where they cannot replace the 
loss in economic activity caused by falling prices. It also indicates that the only benefits that can 
be accrued from the harvest of natural resources are those that are directly obtained from selling 
them. Thus for long term growth, perhaps it is not beneficial for states to depend so heavily on 
natural resources. 
It is important to note that there are a plethora of other variables that are influenced by 
the natural resource curse that we were not able to account for. Factors such as corruption and 
local variation between political practices are much harder to quantify at the state level, yet 
previous research at the national level has indicated that they may indeed play a large role. 
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It is also worth noting that there are a few factors potentially biasing our results. We were 
only able to analyze the mining sector, due to limitations on available data and there are other 
sectors of the economy to consider as well, such as timber and other primary resources. 
Therefore it is possible that the high correlation we see between our results and the price of oil is 
due to the large presence of oil within the composition of our explanatory variable. Nevertheless, 
even supposing that oil were the only resource that had this negative effect, this would still have 
significant implications. This is because oil is clearly one of the most integral commodities of the 
modern developed economy, and many states must often make policy on how best to exploit it. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
http://zfacts.com/p/847.html 
  
This graph shows the movement of real oil prices over the period from 1960-2008. Note that the decline of oil prices occurs in the period 1980-
1984, the first period in our sample for which TFP growth attributable to NATSHARE is negative.     
Source: Energy Information Administration. 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 From this data, we see clear results that there is a clear negative effect overall on the size 
of a state’s oil and mining sector and the growth rate in TFP for this state. Yet from our more 
focused analysis of the five year periods, we also see that this relationship seems to be in part, 
based largely on the price of oil. When oil prices are high, there appears to be an overall positive 
relationship between the TFP growth of a state and the size of the natural resource sector, when 
oil prices are low, a negative one. 
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 This lends support to the theory that overall, an investment in the natural resource sector 
can have a negative effect on TFP growth because it is so highly dependent on the price of the 
good in question. As Van der Ploegg and Poelhekke(2009) argue, this volatility could lead to an 
overall decrease in investment, which could lead to long term decreases in growth. The channel 
provided by Koren and Tenreyro (2007) may also apply here. If the fortunes of a state are too 
highly tied to the price of one commodity, then they will overinvest in this commodity when 
prices are high, to the point where they will not be able to make up for the shortfall in revenues 
and economic activity when prices are low. thus, by being tied disproportionately to one very 
volatile commodity, their fortunes will ebb and flow with the prices of this commodity, making 
consistent investment and TFP growth unlikely. A well diversified state, on the other hand, 
would be able to switch focus to other industries to make up for the shortcoming. This would 
allow other economic activity to occur that would enable the growth of TFP. 
 Thus it is possible, that, at least in regards to oil and mining, a sort of natural resource 
curse does apply to U.S. states. An overinvestment in oil during times when prices were high 
may lead to an inability to switch resources to production of other goods when prices are low, 
thus leading to a long term overall depression in growth. 
 This raises questions about several relevant policy issues. Should state governments 
discourage or encourage further expansion of drilling and oil production? Should the 
governments of states with large natural resource wealth take measures to abate increasing 
dependence on such wealth? Our data would suggest that perhaps they should. 
 Further research should focus on an analysis of other sectors as well as oil and mining. It 
should also seek to apply the spatial equilibrium assumptions we have used here to regressions of 
data that include other controlling variables, such as political factors and the size of sectors such 
as research and development and the other control variables used by Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh(2006).  As mentioned previously in the literature review, the strongest results nationally 
came from combining the Dutch disease channels with explanatory variables based on political 
factors, and it would be interesting to see whether this holds true for U.S. states. For example, 
does rent seeking by oil companies themselves account for the overinvestment in natural 
resources?  It would also be worthwhile to determine how much a lack of growth in some U.S. 
states affects the well-being of the nation as a whole.  
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VI.  Data Appendix 
For data on state- by- state GDP in the years 1963-2008 I have used the NAICS and SIC 
measures of GDP in current dollars. The SIC data ends in 1997 and is replaced by the NAICS 
data for the same period.  
 We obtained data on population from the United States Census. We obtained this data 
using the Center for Disease Control’s websites at http://www.cdc.gov/. 
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 Our measure of the independent variable NATSHARE is constructed from the NAICS 
and SIC measure for mining output. This measure is defined in both systems as “all 
establishments primarily engaged in mining. The term mining is used in the broad sense to 
include the extraction of minerals occurring naturally: solids, such as coal and ores; liquids, such 
as crude petroleum; and gases such as natural gas. The term mining is also used in the broad 
sense to include quarrying, well operations, milling (e.g., crushing, screening, washing, 
flotation), and other preparation customarily done at the mine site, or as a part of mining 
activity.”2 
 In order to express the dollar estimates for both GDP/Capita and NATSHARE in real 
terms, we have used CPI annual average estimates compiled by the U.S. Department of Labor 
Bureau of Labor and statistics obtained from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt 
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